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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
The mockery of democracy 
In December 2007, then Russian President Vladimir Putin announced his 
intention to leave the presidency as constitutionally-mandated in favor of a 
chosen successor, Dmitri Medvedev.  He then assumed leadership of the 
majority party in the Duma and declared his willingness to serve as prime 
minister, should the incoming president so choose.  There was substantial relief 
that Putin had decided against amending the constitution to permit himself a third 
term (an option favored by a faction of his siloviki friends). There was little 
suspense that Russian political life would not proceed as Putin had suggested, 
but a great deal of bandwidth was consumed, and ink spilt, over the possibility 
that Putin's successor to the presidency would have enough independence to 
make his own mark on Russian politics.  In December 2008, it seems clear that 
there are answers for any lingering doubts. 
 
While the Russian presidential election this year provided little uncertainty over 
the choice of the electorate with the anticipated victory of Putin's chosen 
successor, there were moments, many forcefully conveyed by Medvedev himself, 
that suggested the powers awarded to a Russian president by the Constitution 
would not be wasted on a Putin puppet, but rather would result in a dynamic, if 
occasionally tense, tandem of leadership. 
 
The choice of Medvedev as successor had seemed a resounding defeat of the 
Sechin faction of the powerful siloviki clan around Putin, and as such seemed to 
mark a change of fortune for some apparatchiki, as new opportunities opened 
from the previously clenched siloviki fist.  The emergence of Sechin and other 
 2 
"defeated" faction members in the governmental structures appeared quite 
possibly as a face-saving sop to previously powerful figures.  However, events 
belie that interpretation.  Sechin, particularly in key Russian economic sectors, 
such as the oil and gas industries, seems fully in control of policy and 
indispensable to the "art of the deal" for any new initiatives. 
 
For a few months after the presidential elections, the dynamics of the Putin-
Medvedev tandem were suitably inscrutable:  Medvedev made few moves that 
seemed inconsistent with a new president settling into power, and Putin 
appeared to be occupied with governmental and party affairs.  Despite 
allegations that Putin had grown "bored" with the work of the government and 
was conducting affairs without the traditional weekly cabinet meetings (1), Putin 
did soon reassert himself into the affairs of a mining company, Mechel, whose 
stock declined precipitously following the prime minister's remarks. (2) 
 
The war in Georgia marked the decisive moment when the relationship between 
Medvedev and Putin became clear, and more importantly perhaps, the real seat 
of power in Russia was revealed.  The incident, broadcast on Russian Television, 
occurred on August 10th, when Putin, having abandoned the idea of heading 
directly to refugee camps and hospitals in North Ossetia, now reported to 
President Medvedev.  Instead of a chronicle of events and recommendations, 
Putin directed Medvedev (as one might a subordinate) to issue the relevant 
decrees: "I think it would be right for the President to issue this instruction to the 
Military Prosecutor’s Office." (3) 
 
The negotiations for a ceasefire in Georgia, conducted with the French President 
Nicolas Sarkozy, did little to dispel the notion that Medvedev was not in charge:  
Repeated statements by the Russian President that troops were withdrawing and 
the conditions of the ceasefire were being implemented were proven wrong by 
facts on the ground, leading the US Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, to 
assert that "the word of the Russian president needs to be upheld by his forces." 
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(4)  It quickly became clear that there was not a disconnect between the Russian 
military and the political establishment, leading to the supposition that the 
President's word was not the final word in Russian affairs.  It takes little effort, 
then, to isolate the actual seat of authority in Russia. 
 
Without concern for properly functioning institutions or constitutionally-delineated 
authority, the Putin-Medvedev diarchy still could have functioned easily, despite 
the exposure of the relative power status of the tandem members.  However, the 
economic crisis, the gravity of which became clearer in September and October, 
posed a challenge, particularly to Putin.  As prime minister, Putin is nominally in 
charge of the Russian economy and financial system.  As the worldwide financial 
crisis is felt in Russia, particularly through steep stock market declines, falling 
energy prices, and currency devaluation, someone will have to shoulder 
responsibility for failed policies and resign.  In the Russian system devised by the 
Yel'tsin team with its strong presidential authority, the prime minister had proven 
remarkably dispensable.  The Putin-initiated shift of authority from the Kremlin to 
the White House poses a thorny challenge in difficult economic times:  with a 
financial crisis in full effect: who shall be held responsible through resignation? 
 
By late October, the President's scheduled address to the Federal Assembly was 
inexplicably postponed.  When it was at last delivered, Medvedev had included a 
call for a constitutional amendment to lengthen both presidential and 
parliamentary terms.  (5)  The parliament moved quickly to approve the 
amendments, as analysts recognized a clear channel was being created for Putin 
to return to the presidency – perhaps  in early elections.   Even absent early 
elections, recent months have seen a decisive shift in the focus of power from 
the Kremlin to the Prime Minister as a personality.  As one commentator 
observes: "Today's prime minister in Russia is more than a prime minister. He is 
the brand of the regime, its mind, honour, conscience, and in recent years also 
the sex symbol of his era.  For now he is in total denial of reality. He reacts 
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extremely painfully and sharply to attempts by his subordinates to acquaint him 
with the current moment." (6) 
 
It seems difficult to imagine that a scarce year has passed since Putin won praise 
for not circumventing the constitution to secure a third term in the Kremlin.  And 
yet, the information gained in this year about the character of the current Russian 
political system is immense.  Where any doubt existed about a special path for 
Russia's "transition to democracy," there is now a clear map for an authoritarian 
ruler to cling to power, and the means (economic, social and media) to convince 
the population that this is for the best.  Sadly, Russia has put its own twist on 
democracy. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) "The Government in a 'Velvet' Regime," Report by Igor Naumov, 
Nezavisimaya gazeta, 8 Sep 08; BBC Monitoring International Reports, 26 Sep 
08 via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(2) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 1, 18 September 08, Domestic 
Issues. 
(3) "Beginning of working Meeting with Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, 10 Aug 08 
via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2008/08/10/0343_type82913_205084.shtml. 
(4) "Meet the Press" Transcript for August 17, 2008 via 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/26252093/. 
(5) " Russian president Medvedev's first annual address to parliament," 5 Nov 08, 
Rossiya TV via Johnson's Russia List (JRL), 2008-#202, 6 Nov 08. 
(6) "Putin's 3 July," by Andrei Piontkovsky, Grani.ru, 7 Nov 08; BBC Monitoring 
via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Journalism: Still Russia’s most dangerous profession  
Mikhail Vasilyevich Beketov is the founder, editor-in-chief and only reporter of the 
Khimkinskaya pravda, a sporadically-published newspaper covering social 
political life in Khimki, a small suburb of Moscow.  Although the paper was only 
two years and 19 issues old, Beketov, a 50-year old local, had built a reputation 
as a dogged reporter committed to “[writing] what he thought” and battling the 
municipal administration over environmental concerns. (1) Beketov was best 
known for his crusade to protect the Khimki forest.  Since the Kremlin announced 
two years ago that it planned to demolish sections of the 2,400-acre forest, in 
order to build a highway between St. Petersburg and Moscow, Beketov, despite 
repeated warnings to stop, had written a stream of angry articles criticizing the 
plan and calling for the preservation of the forest.  Unfortunately, not everyone 
appreciated his boldness.  In May of last year, someone set Beketov’s car on fire.  
Not long after, a local official approached him while he was the featured speaker 
at a rally protesting the highway.  According to Beketov’s friends and family, the 
official warned him that if he wanted problems, he would find them. (2) 
 
This “promise” was realized on November 12 when Beketov was attacked and 
severely beaten outside his home. He was taken to the hospital after lying on the 
ground for more than a day and has since lost his right leg to gangrene. Beketov 
remains in a skull fracture-induced coma and doctors currently refuse to 
comment on whether or not he is expected to wake anytime soon or, indeed, if 
he is likely to survive at all. (3) 
 
A week after Beketov was attacked, the chairman of the media commission of 
Russia’s Public Chamber announced the organization’s plan to work more with 
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local and regional officials, in order to prevent further attacks against journalists.  
It also plans to establish “a center for the protection of journalists, a kind of 
service for emergency help to which media workers will be able to turn if they feel 
they are in danger.” (4) 
 
This gesture is too little, too late.  Since the early 1990s, the media environment 
in Russia has become increasingly repressive.  For a brief period immediately 
before and after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the burgeoning independent 
media and a new emphasis on freedom of expression helped propagate the hope 
that affairs were changing for the better.  However, if media transparency is an 
accurate indicator of the level of freedom and human rights overall, things in 
Russia may be moving backwards, not forwards.  
 
According to the Committee to Protect Journalists, 49 journalists have been killed 
in Russia since 1992.  This number places it in the top three most dangerous 
countries for reporters, behind only Algeria and Iraq. (5) These statistics raise the 
question of why, in a seemingly developed, educated, modern country, Russia is 
still such a dangerous place for journalists to work. Part of the answer is that 
traditionally, there has never really been freedom of expression in Russia.  Since 
Vladimir Putin came to power in 2000, the Kremlin has taken control of public 
television and most of the print media, ensuring that dissenting opinions or 
independent media outlets, mostly newspapers and radio stations, are few and 
far between, without equal resources and protection, and under constant 
pressure to reform. 
 
At the Kremlin’s insistence, the media also have fostered a climate of extreme 
nationalism and growing intolerance toward dissenters.  On average, there are 
80 attacks on journalists per year, leading some to compare the current 
atmosphere with that of the former Soviet Union. (6) 
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Legal controls have added to the pressure on journalists. According to Russia’s 
criminal code, anyone who criticizes the government can be prosecuted for 
extremism. (7) Inversely, there are no real laws or other legal protections that 
guarantee freedom of the media, (8) making those who speak out against 
perceived injustice even more vulnerable.  
 
In order to continue to foster the impression that Russia is no longer a totalitarian 
state, the Kremlin has stopped short of completely shutting down the country’s 
independent media. Instead, it has opted to replace Soviet-era ideological control 
with subtler, but no less extreme, censorship and information control in the form 
of judicial pressure and intimidation that ranges from subtle threats to physical 
violence and murder.  With these threats looming, most journalists choose to 
self-censor, avoiding topics like government corruption and the activities of the 
Federal Security Service (FSB), as well as issues concerning politically charged 
regions of the country, such as the North Caucasus. (9)  
 
Those that charge ahead anyway, like Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist 
who built her career writing about Russian war atrocities and human rights 
abuses in Chechnya, live with uncertainty.  Politkovskaya, who worked at the 
small independent paper Novaya gazeta, was shot in her apartment building’s 
elevator on October 7, 2006.  It was the 13th contract-style killing of a journalist 
during Putin’s presidency. Although four men, including Colonel Pavel Ryaguzov, 
a FSB officer who allegedly gave the killers Politkovskaya’s address, and a 
Moscow city policeman, have been arrested in connection with the event, neither 
the actual gunman nor the person who ordered the killing has been 
apprehended. (10) [See below.] This may not be an accident.  As with the media, 
the actions of law enforcement personnel are monitored strictly.  While “Russian 
authorities are very capable of investigating crimes, … the political will is not 
there.” (11) If even those who investigate crimes fear reprisal from a higher 
authority, how can anyone expect justice to prevail? 
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Last week, lawyers for the defense accused the Russian government of ignoring 
suspected gunman Rustam Makhmudov’s offer to return to Russia if he was 
guaranteed physical protection, amnesty for a previous kidnapping charge, and a 
public and fair trial.  He is suspected to have fled the country and currently is 
living abroad.  Although government representatives deny this claim, 
Makhmudov’s lawyers told the press that the offer, which was sent through 
relatives six months ago, was immediately refused. (12) 
 
The Politkovskaya trial also reflects poorly on the effectiveness of the Russian 
judiciary.  The trial was derided as a farce from the beginning because authorities 
gave it a green light, despite the fact that the official motivation for the attack has 
not been established, and the actual perpetrator remains at large. The trial, 
currently underway at the Moscow Military District Court because of Ryaguzov’s 
involvement, also has become a media circus. This is mainly due to Chief Judge 
Yevgeny Zubov’s constant waffling over whether or not the trial should remain 
open to the press, reportedly because the jurors “were afraid to enter the 
courtroom in the presence of mass media people.” (13) In mid-November the trial 
was suspended so that defense attorneys could participate in a different trial. 
Soon after, the prosecution demanded that the judge be removed for showing 
bias and for failing to follow correct procedures related to opening and closing the 
trial. (14) Although the request ultimately was denied, (15) these issues have 
taken the focus away from the victim and the real matters at hand, casting a 
shadow over the viability of the court system to dispense justice effectively. 
 
Beketov and Politkovskaya are not alone.  Most cases involving injured and 
murdered journalists remain unsolved and only partially investigated. (17) It is 
becoming increasingly apparent that the same people who are able to silence 
dissent are equally adept at preventing due process and fair trials. 
 
Both Putin and current president Dmitri Medvedev are aware of the importance of 
an effective legal and judicial system.  Putin came to power after promising to 
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bring “a dictatorship of the law” to the country, and Medvedev repeatedly has 
promised to respect the law and abolish “legal nihilism.” (16). Unfortunately, 
these words are meaningless without action taken to enforce them. As 
mentioned before, the common thread is political will: journalists must submit to 
it, the authorities lack it, and the Kremlin controls it. Until this changes, nothing 
else will. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Russian state TV considers reasons behind attack on critical journalist,” 
Rossiya TV, 19 Nov 08; BBC Monitoring, 19 Nov 08 via Johnson’s Russia List 
(JRL), 24 Nov 08, 2008-#215. 
(2) Alex Rodriguez , “In Russia, crusade at your own risk,” Chicago Tribune, 23 
Nov 08 via http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-russia-
letter_rodrigueznov24,0,7879861.story.  Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Russian state TV considers reasons behind attack on critical journalist,” Ibid. 
(5) "Journalists Killed," Committee to Protect Journalists, 14 Oct 08 via 
http://www.cpj.org/deadly/. Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(6) Luke Harding, “To be a journalist in Russia is suicide,” Mail and Guardian 
Online, 1 Dec 08 via http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-12-01-to-be-a-journalist-in-
russia-is-suicide.  Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(7) Ibid. 
(8) Christopher Walker, “Freedom House, Muzzling the Media: The Return of 
Censorship in the Commonwealth of Independent States,” Freedom House, 15 
Jun 07 via 
www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/press_release/muzzlingthemedia_15june07.pdf. 
Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(9) “To be a journalist in Russia is suicide,” Ibid. 
(10) “Politkovskaya murder case opens,” BBC News, 17 Nov 08 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7732760.stm. Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(11) “To be a journalist in Russia is suicide,” Ibid. 
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(12) Ellen Barry, “Russia: Suspect in Journalist’s Killing Makes an Offer,” New 
York Times, 3 Dec 08 via 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/03/world/europe/03briefs-
SUSPECTINJOU_BRF.html. Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(13) “Moscow Court Begin To Examine Journalist's Assassination On Merits,” 
ITAR-TASS, 19 Nov 08 via http://www.itar-
tass.com/txt/eng/level2.html?NewsID=13272102&PageNum=0.  Last accessed 6 
Dec 08. 
(14) “Russia murder trial judge queried,” BBC News, 25 Nov 08 via 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/7747816.stm. Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(15) Michael Schwirtz, “Russia: Bid to Remove Judge Fails,” New York Times, 27 
Nov 08 via http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/world/europe/27briefs-
BIDTOREMOVEJ_BRF.html. Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(16) “Russia on Trial,” Times Online, 18 Nov 08 via 
http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/leading_article/article5175848.ece. 
Last accessed 6 Dec 08. 
(17) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
 
Korabel’nikov's resignation? 
Early in November, GRU Chief General Valentin Korabel’nikov spoke to 
members of the domestic press, addressing issues such as Ballistic Missile 
Defense and the recent Georgian conflict, his comments were designed as a 
clear signal that GRU still has a leading role to play in Russia's defenses, and 
that those who might seek to overtake the agency face a difficult fight. (1)  
    
On 29 November, several sources claimed that a number of Russia's senior 
military leaders had submitted their resignations to Minister of Defense Anatoli 
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Serdyukov, (2) in protest at the military reforms soon to be enacted. The officers 
named by the reports included General Vladimir Isakov, Deputy Defense Minister 
and Head of Logistics, Central Command Chief Vladimir Goshkoder, six heads of 
the General Staff's "operational departments," and General  Korabel’nikov. (3) 
On the same day, Defense Ministry spokesman Colonel Aleksandr Drobyshevsky 
issued a statement to the effect that the resignation stories constituted nothing 
more than "brazen lies." (4) At the time of writing, no further statements have 
been made, and none of the resignations have been officially confirmed. (5)  
    
It has at least partly due to  Korabel’nikov's influence that military intelligence had 
been able to resist being taken over by the FSB—unlike a number of other 
security agencies. If  Korabel’nikov has indeed resigned, GRU's fight to remain a 
separate entity may have been dealt a hammer blow. 
 
Litvinenko murder update  
For approximately one year, the Litvinenko murder case has been frozen at an 
impasse. In November 2007, instead of re-filing an extradition request against 
their prime suspect, Andrei Lugovoi, British authorities asked Russian 
prosecutors to investigate the case themselves, so as to assist Scotland Yard's 
efforts to gather more evidence. This olive branch was rejected out of hand with 
Prosecutor General Yuri Chaika arguing that no "proof" of Lugovoi's guilt had 
been provided, and insisting that British law-enforcement authorities first should 
publish their evidence before any further steps could be taken. In December 
2007, Lugovoi obtained a seat in the Duma elections. By dint of this fact, the 
prime suspect received parliamentary immunity, theoretically making it 
impossible to prosecute him for the foreseeable future. (6)  
    
During the last 3 weeks, the Litvinenko story has come to life again. On 16 
November, Ren TV featured a documentary about the case, arguing that British 
forensic experts were withholding Litvinenko's autopsy file from publication 
because it indicated that he had come into contact with Polonium 210 (the 
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substance used to kill him) before meeting Lugovoi. (7) As he has done in the 
past, Lugovoi claimed that Litvinenko had set up their meeting in order to recruit 
him as a double agent for MI6. 
 
Nine days after the documentary aired, Lugovoi participated in two further 
interviews. Speaking to Interfax, he claimed that the "British judiciary" was at fault 
for the lack of progress, due to their refusal to "meet with us," their failure to 
propose "anything" constructive. His attempts to "establish" good "cooperation" 
with British authorities had "hit a wall of misapprehension." Lugovoi stated that he 
had "urged the gentlemen in London to finally get down to the investigation…in 
their territory," and alleged that this was not happening because "it looks like the 
British state machine is directly involved in the Litvinenko murder." (8) Speaking 
to Ekho Moskvy, Lugovoi claimed that he would be willing to travel to the United 
Kingdom to assist authorities there in expediting the case, if "the British 
Prosecution Service behaves decently" (9) and guaranteed him full immunity. 
(10) The reason for the documentary and the interviews is that the two year 
anniversary of Litvinenko's death occurred on 22 November, with a memorial 
rally held in Moscow that day. (11)  
    
British authorities have shied away, at least officially,  from implicating the 
Russian state in the murder, instead portraying it as a personal vendetta on 
Lugovoi's part. Lugovoi's tactics are strange. On the one hand, his comments 
seem designed as an attempt to force British authorities to up the ante—to 
answer his allegations by claiming that Litvinenko's murder was ordered by the 
Kremlin, thereby making it even less likely that he will be extradited. On the other 
hand, his assertion of willingness to travel to the United Kingdom may be a 
manifestation of fears for his own safety, and his insistence on immunity a signal 
that he will spill the whole story if his safety (read asylum?) is guaranteed. If this 
is the case, Lugovoi is playing a very dangerous game of chess, and he is not 
playing it well. Threatening the Russian State—particularly from within Russia—
is hardly conducive to one's personal safety. 
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Politkovskaya trial drama 
Three weeks ago, the trial of three men accused of complicity in Anna 
Politkovskaya's murder began in Moscow. Early in the proceedings, the presiding 
judge ruled that the courtroom would be open to the public, and that journalists 
would be permitted to attend. (12) Later the same day, the judge reversed his 
decision, ruling that the case should proceed in secret. According to Judge 
Yevgeni Zubov, the volte-face occurred because he received notification from the 
jury that they "would not enter the courtroom before all print and broadcast 
journalists" had left. (13)  
    
Reaction to the judge's decision ranged from resignation, with Karrina 
Moskalenko (attorney for Politkovskaya's family) noting that "I could expect this if 
there were a threat to the jury," (14) to outrage from Dmitri Muratov, Editor in 
Chief of Novaya gazeta, who commented that the ruling was "a disgraceful, 
secret, backroom decision, which will prevent society from getting acquainted 
with how the case was built." (15)  
    
The most surprising reaction to Zubov's ruling however, came from the jury itself. 
On 20 November, Yevgeni Kolesov, one of the jurors involved, spoke to Ekho 
Moskvy Radio. Kolesov claimed that pressure had been exerted on the group by 
a "court official" to agree to a statement that "we wanted to bar the media 
because we were afraid." The jury not only refused to do so, but also sent a letter 
to the judge "denying" that they wanted reporters removed.  Authorities, so 
Kolesov stated,  "made a laughing stock of us." (16) 
    
Given that Zubov's opening remarks at the possibility of a closed trial, in the 
event that the jury felt threatened, (17) it seems clear that authorities ran what 
Muratov has called a "special operation," designed to legitimize a secret hearing. 
(18) If Muratov's theory is correct, and there is no reason to doubt it, Kolesov's 
interview has thrown a serious wrench into the plan. On 26 November, reports 
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emerged that the Prosecutor General's office had asked Judge Zubov to recuse 
himself from the case, because his actions hinted at outside "interference" in the 
trial. (19)  
    
Zubov refused to step down, instead announcing a ten day recess, and reversed 
his decision to close the proceedings. Once the trial restarted, jurors heard 
testimony from Politkovskaya's two children and were presented with "forensic 
evidence" in the form of "fibers" linking the putative trigger-man (and brother of 2 
defendants), Rustam Makhmudov, to the getaway vehicle. At the time of writing, 
the trial has been moved into closed session for a temporary period, while 
classified evidence is presented to the jury. (20) 
    
It must be stated that the jury showed remarkable courage in stepping forward to 
contradict the judge's explanation. But the way in which the fallout has been 
handled again demonstrates that adverse publicity does not really concern the 
authorities. If the desire to remove Zubov and to have a “clean” trial for public 
relations purposes had been real, his superiors simply could have ordered him to 
step down. The fact that he has been allowed to continue to run what must now 
be viewed as an utter sham, demonstrates once more that those in positions of 
power in Russia have no real interest in seeing the Politkovskaya murder solved. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1)"Russian Military Intelligence Watching World Situation Closely," ITAR-TASS, 
4 Nov 08; OSC Summary via World News Connection. 
(2) "Russia's Top Brass To Resign Over Military Reform As Discontent In Army 
Grows-Newspaper," Ekho Moskvy Radio, Moscow, in Russian, 29 Nov 08; BBC 
Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(3) "Defense Ministry Denies Reports on Resignation Of Top Military Officials 
(Part 2)," Interfax, 29 Nov 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection. 
(4) Ibid.  
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(5) "Russia's Top Brass To Resign Over Military Reform As Discontent In Army 
Grows," Ekho Moskvy Radio, 29 Nov 08; OSC Translated Text via World News 
Connection.  
(6) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 7 (31 Jan 08).  
(7) "Russian TV Casts Doubt On UK Theory of Litvinenko's Death," RenTV, 16 
Nov 08; OSC Translated Excerpt via World News Connection.  
(8) "Lugovoi Urges Britain To Busy Itself With Investigating Litvinenko Murder," 
Interfax-AVN Online, 25 November 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News 
Connection.  
 (9) "Russia: Litvinenko Case Suspect Says Britain 'Refuses To Cooperate,' 
Interfax, 25 Nov 08; OSC Translated Excerpt via World News Connection.  
 (10) "Lugovoi Offers To Go To UK Over Litvinenko Murder," Interfax-AVN 
Online, 24 Nov 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection.  
 (11) "Rally In Memory Of Former Security Officer Held In Central Moscow," Ekho 
Moskvy Radio, 22 Nov 08; OSC Translated Text via World News Connection.  
 (12) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 5 (20 Nov 08).  
 (13) "Russia: Watchdog Condemns Court's Decision To Close Politkovskaya 
Trial," Committee To Protect Journalists Press Release, New York, in English, 19 
Nov 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
 (14) "Moscow Court Closes Politkovskaya Trial To Public," The New York Times, 
20 Nov 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 (15) "International: Politkovskaya Supporters Condemn Secret Trial; Judge 
Overturns Decision To Hold Case In Public; Colleagues of Murdered Journalist 
'Appalled,'” The Guardian-Final Edition, 20 Nov 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 (16) "Juror Defies Russian Court's Attempts to Close Trial; Judge in Case of 
Journalist's Slaying Had Said Panel Requested Move To Avoid Media Attention," 
The Washington Post, 21 Nov 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 (17) Ibid.  
 (18) Ibid.  
 (19) "International: Politkovskaya Killing Ordered By Politician, Lawyers Claim," 
The Guardian-Final Edition, 26 Nov 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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 (20) "Anna Politkovskaya Trial Moves Into Closed Court to Hear Secret 
Testimony," The Guardian, 4 Dec 08 via 
www.guardian.co.uk/media/2008/dec/04/anna-politkovskaya-trial. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Erik Rundquist 
 
Russian military reform: still on track? 
The Russian military continues its transformational journey to become a more 
agile force to meet 21st century requirements.  Unit restructuring and troop 
downsizing comprise the centerpiece of the military’s reform.  In addition, the 
Russian armed forces’ ability to execute basic and advanced combat training, in 
the presence of a severe force drawdown, has grabbed headlines with the 
closing and/or shifting of military training programs. (1)  Finally, the voice of “loyal 
opposition” continues to resonate with politicians, generals, and pundits sounding 
off against Defense Minister Anatoli Serdyukov’s plans. 
 
Unit restructuring and troop downsizing 
To support Serdyukov’s cuts, the Russian Air Force plans to reduce its officer 
corps by nearly 50,000 members, staffing certain positions with civilians by 2012. 
(2)  The Russian Air Force also is restructuring its forces to focus on smaller 
squadron-level operations (versus division or regiment) and spread throughout 
55 air bases.  These units will be structured under major organizations such as 
strategic command of air and space defense, a nuclear-equipped strategic 
aviation force, a military-transport command, and air defense commands. (3) 
 
The navy continues to follow suit with its force reductions, as sources recently 
identified cuts for officers aboard its nuclear submarines.  Many of the officer 
positions are centered in and around the nuclear reactor and engineering 
operations, such that a sub crew of 73 may lose up to seven officers, possibly to 
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be replaced by contract servicemen. (4)  This announcement was made on the 
heels of the 8 November 2008 submarine accident aboard the Nerpa, when freon 
gas swept through two compartments killing 20 and injuring another 21 crew 
members. (5) 
 
Combat service support cuts also have been more clearly defined.  The head of 
the main Military Medical Department of the Russian Defense Ministry, Major 
General Vladimir Shappo, acknowledged that 30 percent of Russian military 
medical structures would be cut, noting, “The issue is about specialists working in 
narrow fields.” (6)  One can infer that the intent of these reductions is to strip 
some  advanced surgical care capabilities from front line units, although Shappo 
added that medical care for soldiers will not be degraded. (7) 
 
Like their combat maneuver brigade counterparts, logistical support forces are 
being changed.  Lieutenant General Fedor Aleksakov, Chief of the Russian 
Defense Ministry’s Central Automotive Department, identified nine motor 
transport brigades that would be eliminated as part of the reform, while two 
battalions would be delivered to each military district, with a focus on maintaining 
a similar number of automotive troops. (8)  While mathematically it appears that 
this measure cuts the number of transport units by at least half, General 
Aleksakov adds, “In my view, these forces are quite sufficient for conducting any 
resupply operation.” (9) 
 
The commander of the Russian Strategic Missile Troops (RVSN), Colonel 
General Nikolai Solostov, also is leading a massive force drawdown and 
restructuring effort of the forces under his command.  He remarked that the 
vacated officer posts would be filled by trained sergeants and civilians.  In 
addition, the RVSN’s reform measures include refitting and upgrading nuclear 
security systems and would be completed by 2015. (10)  Solostov also identified 
his force reduction numbers, “As of 1 January 2009, the RVSN will consist of 
three missile armies and 12 missile divisions, while it is planned that as of 1 
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January 2016 the RVSN’s combat strength will consist of two armies and nine 
divisions.” (11) 
 
Reform impacts on training 
With a smaller army, the need for enhanced training is paramount.  However, 
part of the reform measures call for a large cut in the military tutor program.  
According to sources, the Main Department for Tutorship will be placed under the 
Main Personnel Department and the number of tutors will go from 17,500 
positions to approximately 5,000 tutors by the end of 2009. (12)  The percentage 
decrease of military tutors is close to 70 percent, which outpaces the overall 
military drop.  In fact, Lieutenant General Anatoly Bashlakov, head of the 
Department for Tutorship, is likely to resign. (13) 
 
Despite the decrease in the number of military tutors (likely to affect individual 
training and professional development), Russian military leaders hope that team 
and tactical training exercises will continue at a vigorous pace in 2009.  There 
are currently 40 division/brigade exercises, 700 battalion exercises, and 400 
command drills scheduled for next year. (14)  A spokesman for the Training and 
Service Department noted, “Despite serious reorganization, the intensity of 
combat and tactical training this year must not be lower than last year.” (15)  
Complex tactical exercises may be hamstrung if particular brigades are still in the 
process of relocating and bedding down their units, upgrading their equipment, or 
in the midst of training enlisted troops to fill the vacant posts of the recently-
ousted junior officers.  
 
War of words 
Change inevitably brings about opposing views and the Russian military reforms 
are no exception.  According to some reports, senior military leaders are 
departing in droves.  The Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee on 
Security, Gennadi Gudkov, commented in an interview, “I  can say that many 
generals have recently resigned voluntarily.  They resign because they disagree 
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with the reforms that are being carried out or will be carried out.  At least, as I 
understand, these reforms were not discussed even with the generals.” (16)  
Some sources corroborate this fact, reporting that several senior generals have 
tendered their resignations, including General Valentin Korabel’nikov, head of the 
General Staff’s Intelligence Division (GRU). (17)  
 
In addition, retired officers and “military experts” have entered into the public fray 
and are interviewed regularly on Russian media programs to blast reform plans.  
The former commander-in-chief of the Russian Air Force, Petr Deynekin noted 
that the military reforms are taking place “secretively,” with the public completely 
unaware of the proceedings. (18)  In the same interview, former Defense Ministry 
Press Secretary Viktor Baranets added, “… we are not dealing with a serious 
military reform but with some kind of Bolshevik adventurous scheme.” (19)  Other 
retired senior officers have added to the public rhetoric by calling for the Defense 
Minister’s resignation and have warned of the possibility of an “open revolt” if the 
reforms are not altered. (20) 
 
Defense Minister Serdyukov is not taking these charges lightly and is attempting 
to blunt these attacks and allay the public’s fear of change.  Defense Ministry 
spokesmen have issued statements emphatically denying that senior leaders are 
resigning.  In addition, deputy ministers were dispatched to all of the military 
districts on an “information campaign” to better explain the impending reforms to 
all servicemen. (21)  The Defense Ministry promptly denied reports that “gag 
orders” had been enacted by the Chief of the General Staff, in order to prevent 
news of the military reform measures from being disseminated to the public. (22)  
 
These reforms are pushing ahead in the midst of a precarious global economy.  
With the projected loss of thousands of officer positions, the exodus of 
experienced generals, the high costs of new military infrastructure and advanced 
systems, and the need for realistic training, Defense Minister Serdyukov likely will 
be an extremely busy individual.  His next test is to report the status of the reform 
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to the Federation Council of the Upper House of Parliament on 17 December 
2008. (23)                
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(1) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XV, Number 5 (20 Nov 08). 
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(3) Ibid. 
(4) “Russian nuclear submarine crews face cuts – source tells news agency,” 
Interfax-AVN, 19 Nov 08; BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union – Political, 20 
Nov 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Shaun Barnes 
 
NATO summit is a mixed bag for Russia 
On December 3rd, the NATO foreign ministers’ meeting in Brussels decided 
gradually to resume the alliance’s consultative ties to Moscow that have been 
frozen since Russia’s invasion of Georgia in August.  This move and the foreign 
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ministers’ failure to grant membership action plans (MAPs) to Georgia and the 
Ukraine were hailed as victories by Russian officials.  However, the NATO 
meeting also resulted in several pronouncements that are not as positive, from 
Moscow’s point of view. 
 
After more than three months of being cut off from the NATO-Russia Council 
(NRC), the alliance’s formal liaison branch for Russian relations, Moscow is 
being granted access once again, albeit gradually.  The representatives present 
expressed their ongoing displeasure with Russia’s actions in the Caucasus, as 
well as its recent threat to deploy offensive missiles in Kaliningrad, but still opted 
to move forward cautiously on the issue of consultation.  Their statement read: 
“Taking [Russia’s actions] into account, we have agreed on a measured and 
phased approach: we have mandated the Secretary General to re-engage with 
Russia at the political level; agreed to informal discussions in the NRC; and 
requested the Secretary General to report back to us prior to any decision to 
engage Russia formally in the NRC.” (1) The timeline for resumption of formal 
engagement is as yet unclear, but informal discussions appear to be moving 
rapidly.  According to Russian Deputy Chief of Staff Colonel-General Anatoli 
Nogovitsyn, Russia “immediately [sent] a high-ranking official of the Defence 
Ministry, Army Gen Aleksey Maslov [...] to Brussels as the Russian Federation's 
chief military representative at NATO." (2) 
 
Nogovitsyn went on to say that the restoration of NATO-Russian ties was 
inevitable, given the West’s need for Russian cooperation in resolving a range of 
global security problems. (3)  Interestingly, this interpretation was echoed by both 
the Russian Foreign Ministry, which welcomed NATO’s return to “realism,” (4) 
and NATO Secretary Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, who said “Russia is such an 
important factor in geopolitical terms that there is no alternative for NATO than to 
engage Russia.” (5) 
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The other important decision, from Moscow’s view, was the lack of action on 
providing MAPs for Georgian and Ukrainian accession to the NATO alliance.  
While not reneging on the pledge made in Bucharest to add these states to 
NATO, the conferees decided that both have “significant work left to do” before 
this can take place. (6)  The two aspiring alliance members instead will be taken 
off the traditional membership path and special arrangements will be made with 
each to work toward accession. (7)  Russia’s chief envoy to NATO, Dimitry 
Rogozin, was quick to claim victory on the issue, saying starkly, “In the end the 
alliance blinked - there is no other way to put it.” (8)  
 
However, not all the developments in Brussels amounted to good news for the 
Kremlin.  There are reports that American backing for re-engagement with 
Russia was granted only in return for a German pledge to support expedited 
preparation of Georgia and Ukraine for NATO membership. (9)  The foreign 
ministers’ Final Communiqué is also unequivocal in its backing for America’s 
planned ballistic missile defense system in central Europe.  Its offer of support for 
US-Russian “cooperation proposals” on missile defense may be small 
consolation for Moscow. (10) 
 
While the results of the Brussels meeting offered Moscow some real gains in 
terms of re-opening channels of communication, in the final analysis, the results 
are mixed.  Though there does seem to be lingering tension within NATO, given 
the compromise nature of the decisions on the NRC and MAPs, this did not 
prevent the conference from reaching a consensus.  Support for further NATO 
expansion and the construction of a missile shield mean the rocky nature of 
NATO-Russian ties almost certainly will persist for some time to come. 
 
Russia continues drive for new security treaty 
Russia’s has continued its steady drumbeat for a new security arrangement in 
Europe that supposedly would protect its interests better.  It is becoming 
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increasingly clear that apprehension about NATO’s moves is driving these calls, 
which amount to veiled attempts to constrain the alliance.  
 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov raised the issue once more at a meeting of the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Helsinki.  Lavrov 
couched the need for a new treaty in terms of the failure of the OSCE, 
proclaiming, “ [f]or us it is obvious that the present-day OSCE is not carrying out 
its primary assignment: ensuring equal and indivisible security for all.” (11)  He 
reiterated the call frequently made in recent months by President Dimitri 
Medvedev for a new security framework that ostensibly would redress the 
supposed inequities of the present architecture.  However, the OSCE’s press 
release on the meeting made no mention of Lavrov’s speech, nor did the 
members manage to agree to a joint political declaration. (12) So far the only 
solid backing for the Russian plan has come from the members of the Collective 
Security Treaty Organization, who recently reiterated their endorsement. (13) 
 
It is increasingly apparent that this proposal is Russia’s attempt to restrain the 
NATO alliance in its efforts to incorporate new members and take other actions 
that Moscow portrays as inimical to its security.  Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s 
recent comments at the Conference on Questions of International Humanitarian 
Law make this clear.  He articulated three underlying principles of the new 
framework: “Not to ensure our own security at the expense of the security of 
others [...] Not to allow actions that weaken the unity of the common area of 
security [...] [and] Not to allow the development and expansion of military unions 
to proceed to the detriment of other treaty participants.” (14)  What these points, 
especially the third, suggest is that the proposed treaty would block any NATO 
action that Russia portrays as threatening its security.  As Dimitri Rogozin put it, 
“the existence of NATO loses its current meaning” under this proposal. (15)  
 
In this respect, it is not surprising that the measure did not receive a ringing 
endorsement by the members of the OSCE in Helsinki.  If Russia takes the 
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opportunity to use its calls for a new framework as the basis for a legitimate 
dialogue on a modus vivendi for European security, perhaps an effective 
compromise could be reached that would reduce the tensions of the last several 
years.  But, as long as Moscow persists in peddling a self-serving proposal as a 
multilateral security initiative, the prospects for progress are remote. 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
 
Eleventh-hour energy policy 
On Monday, November 24, Ukrainian officials landed in Moscow for an 
emergency meeting to resolve another looming gas crisis. Russian President 
Dmitri Medvedev demanded repayment of Ukraine’s $2.4 billion debt for gas 
consumed in 2008 before Gazprom signs a new contract for gas deliveries to 
Ukraine in 2009. Without full repayment, Gazprom says, there will be no contract. 
Without a contract, there will be no gas.  “We would like to avoid such a scenario, 
we would like to agree on everything before New Year, but as you understand, 
we cannot deliver gas without a contract,” said Gazprom spokesman Sergei 
Kupriyanov. (1) 
    
The exact figures are in dispute. Gazprom puts Ukraine’s debt arrears at $2.4 
billion, while Ukraine insists that it owes only $1.3 billion, and that the country is 
making good-faith efforts to pay off its debt, amid grave financial circumstances 
that necessitated a $16.4 billion emergency loan from the IMF earlier in 
November. (2) 
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Despite intense negotiations, the Ukrainian officials found their Russian 
colleagues unwilling to compromise. Choosing to ignore an earlier agreement 
between Prime Ministers Yulia Tymoshenko and Vladimir Putin that envisioned a 
gradual rise in gas prices from this year’s rate of $179.50 per thousand cubic 
meters to a market rate in 2011, Gazprom officials are threatening to more than 
double the price of gas for Ukraine to $400 per thousand cubic meters in 2009. 
(3) In a live broadcast televised on December 4, Putin derided Ukrainian pleas to 
hold gas prices at 2008 levels. “Our partners are telling us: Leave this year's 
prices for us. How can we leave this year's prices if today our Ukrainian partners 
are still receiving gas at almost half the European price,” Putin said. Switching to 
Ukrainian, he added (in typical “Putinese”), “are you crazy, or what?” (4)  
    
The current dispute raises a specter of a drop in gas deliveries across Europe 
during the winter holiday season, a replay of the 2006 crisis that reduced gas 
pressure in some western European countries by up to 50 percent. Russia 
supplies over 40 percent of the EU’s gas imports; more than 80 percent of that 
total passes through Ukraine. (5) Putin would not discount the possibility of 
shutting off the taps to Ukraine, if its outstanding debt was not repaid by the New 
Year, though he did promise to warn the EU in advance if a shutoff was 
imminent. For her part, Tymoshenko sought to reassure EU countries, declaring 
that “Ukraine is a reliable partner and transit will be carried out.” (6) 
    
The current crisis cannot have come as a complete surprise to European leaders 
in Brussels. Weary of eleventh-hour consternation over the security of energy 
supplies to the Continent, in late fall the EU sent Energy Commissioner Andris 
Piebalgs to Sungurlu, Turkey, to revive interest in its Nabucco gas pipeline 
project. (7) The project, aimed at diversifying European gas imports by tapping 
into Central Asian volumes and bypassing Russia, has been languishing for 
nearly five years as its backers in the EU try to resolve fundamental problems—
such as finding 31 billion cubic meters of gas by 2020, when the pipeline is 
projected to reach full carrying capacity. Even in the short-term, security of 
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supply has been thrown into jeopardy as Azerbaijan, the pipeline’s main supplier, 
weighs competing EU and Russian bids for its gas volumes in 2012, the year 
Nabucco is expected to come on-line. 
 
In tandem with Turkish and Azerbaijani talks, the European Commission has 
launched a proposal for an Eastern Partnership that will deepen bilateral 
relations and guarantee foreign aid totaling over $775 million to six eastern 
countries in Russia’s traditional ambit: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine. (8) The Partnership, a plan that is expected to be high on 
Brussels’s agenda when the Czech Republic assumes the EU presidency in 
January, was proposed earlier this year by Poland and Sweden to address, 
among other issues, European energy policy. 
 
But as Eastern European countries push for greater independence from Russia, 
their Western European partners tug EU energy policy in the other direction—
back toward Moscow. By forging ahead with a plan to lay the Nord Stream 
pipeline across the Baltic seabed, Germany was rewarded in October with a 
lucrative stake in Yuzhno-Russkoye gas fields of Siberia. (9) In his live television 
appearance, Putin praised Western European leaders for their cooperative spirit 
while berating the anti-Russian “phobias” of “the so-called new Europeans,” in 
Eastern Europe, where opposition to Russian-dominated energy policy remains 
strong. (10) If European leaders are unable or unwilling to commit to a common 
energy policy in the long-term, the Continent will be forced to keep scrambling for 
its gas supplies at the eleventh-hour. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Robyn Angley 
 
GEORGIA 
Georgia shuffle 
The end of the NATO summit seems to have been a trigger for yet more changes 
in President Mikheil Saakashvili’s cabinet, this time accompanied by the 
movement of senior officials elsewhere. Foreign Minister Eka Tkeshelashvili, 
Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili, Economic Minister Eka Sharashidze, and 
Education Minister Ghia Nodia all have lost their positions through recent cabinet 
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changes. Kakha Lomaia of the National Security Council also appears to be on 
his way out. 
 
Georgia’s government has experienced considerable turnover since the August 
war with Russia and “South Ossetia.” In addition to the most recent cabinet 
reshuffling, in the last four months, Saakashvili has named a new prime minister, 
culture minister and environment minister, and accepted the resignation of Badri 
Bitsadze, chief of Georgia’s border police and husband of former Saakashvili ally 
Nino Burjanadze. The major exception to these personnel changes is Interior 
Minister Vano Mirabishvili, who has shown impressive staying power, despite 
being consistently vilified by Georgia’s non-parliamentary opposition. Neither 
Saakashvili nor Prime Minister Mgaloblishvili has given a definitive reason for the 
extensive adjustments in the government, although personnel changes in 
Saakashvili’s administration are certainly not a new phenomenon. For example, 
Tkelashvili’s replacement as foreign minister will be the fourth foreign minister 
Tbilisi has had this year. 
 
The new foreign minister will be Grigol Vashadze, who just last month was 
named Culture Minister. Prior to that appointment, Vashadze had been the 
deputy foreign minister responsible for relations with Russia. As his first order of 
business, Vashadze has called for all deputy foreign ministers to submit their 
resignations. Vashadze holds dual citizenship in Georgia and Russia and worked 
in the Soviet Foreign Ministry for seven years in the 1980s. His appointment may 
be intended as a signal to Russia that Georgia is willing to take steps toward a 
less hostile relationship with its large northern neighbor. 
 
Replacing Vashadze as Culture Minister will be Nika Rurua, an influential 
legislator who is part of Saakashvili’s inner circle and has long held a prominent 
position on parliament’s defense and security committee.  Rurua served as 
deputy chair of that committee until his recent appointment. 
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Georgian Ambassador to the United States David Sikharulidze has been named 
new Defense Minister. Although coming directly from his post in Washington, 
Sikharulidze has a long history in security-related issues. As a parliamentarian, 
he also played a prominent role in the legislature’s defense and security 
committee. Following that post, he led Georgia’s mission to NATO, before 
working as a First Deputy Defense Minister. His appointment—clearly a signal of 
Georgia’s pro-Western intentions and continued NATO aspirations—may be an 
attempt by Saakashvili to balance Foreign Minister Vashadze, whose history in 
the Soviet Foreign Ministry and other Russian connections could be interpreted 
by critics as leaning too far to the north. (One of Vashadze’s first moves in his 
new position was to give an interview with Russian newspaper Kommersant.) 
 
Former Defense Minister Kezerashvili’s dismissal comes as no surprise given the 
disorganization and defeat sustained by the Georgian armed forces in the August 
war with “South Ossetia” and its Russian “protectors.” Although the Georgian 
army hardly could have hoped to crush its Russian opposition, the less than 
stellar performance of Tbilisi’s military makes the dismissal of Kezerashvili not 
unexpected, despite his status as a member of Saakashvili’s inside circle. The 
acting minister, Kutelia, also has very close ties to Saakashvili. 
 
Nika Gvaramia, former Justice Minister and former parliamentarian, will step into 
Ghia Nodia’s shoes as Education Minister. Nodia, formerly of the Caucasus 
Institute for Peace, Democracy, and Development, a prominent Georgian think 
tank, was a staunch supporter of Saakashvili in the Rose Revolution and beyond. 
 
Kakha Lomaia, head of the National Security Council, also is expected to be 
transferred to an unspecified diplomatic posting, according to an announcement 
made by Prime Minister Mgaloblishvili. (1) Lomaia, a longstanding member of the 
Saakashvili group and former director of the Open Society Georgia Foundation, 
served as Education Minister before switching to national security issues. His 
replacement has not yet been named. 
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Apart from the dismissals of senior officials, Georgian ambassador to the UN, 
Irakli Alasania, also has resigned from his post. In the days following his 
resignation, Alasania was reported to be conducting negotiations with the New 
Rights and Republican non-parliamentary opposition parties. Alasania has not 
revealed the reasons behind his resignation, other than to state that he had 
delayed his announcement intentionally until after the NATO summit. A 
November statement, in which the former UN envoy called for the establishment 
of a decision-making system that would “rule out unilateral decisions and will 
reduce threat of Georgia’s involvement in provocations,” (2) would seem to 
indicate that Alasania’s political actions in Tbilisi may be oppositional rather than 
otherwise. 
 
Possibly smoothing the way for future cooperation, the New Rights and 
Republican parties announced on 8 December the formation of an opposition 
alliance. During their announcement, these parties stated that they would look 
favorably on Alasania as a coalition leader. They also declared that they would 
not work with former Prime Minister Zurab Nogaideli’s new political organization, 
but that cooperation with former Speaker of the House and Saakashvili ally Nino 
Burjanadze was possible if she did not pursue the presidency. (3) Alasania has 
not announced an intention to work with the new coalition, but has deferred 
statements on his political plans until his upcoming return to Tbilisi. 
 
Prior to serving at the UN, Alasania was the deputy security minister from 2002-
2004. Afterwards, he held the post of chair of the Abkhaz government-in-exile 
and presidential aide for the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict. He was named to the 
New York position in June 2006. Alasania is known as a skilled negotiator who 
was received with goodwill by both the Abkhaz and Georgian sides of the 
conflict. 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Turkmen elections: quantity, not quality 
Preparations are underway in Turkmenistan for parliamentary elections 
scheduled to take place just a few days away, on December 14.  The Turkmen 
government is portraying the upcoming vote as a leap forward in its march 
toward the development of a democratic and politically open society, placing 
heavy emphasis on the fact that for the first time since Turkmenistan’s 
independence, multiple candidates will be running for each of the 125 seats 
(there are 288 registered candidates).  Indeed, the Central Election Commission 
(CEC) views this fact as clear evidence that the election process has been 
“widely contested, open and transparent, and is characterized by high civic 
engagement of people.”  In an effort to dispel any misgivings that the 
international community might have about the integrity of the election process, 
President Gurbanguly Berdimuhammedow has invited elections observers from 
various international bodies to monitor the polling stations. (1) 
 
The UN Secretariat will send three of its staff members to act as observers, a 
number of CIS observers arrived on November 25 and a group of election 
experts from the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR) arrived in Ashgabat on December 6.  The December 14 elections thus 
also will mark the first time that representatives of international organizations will 
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be permitted to monitor Turkmen elections, another milestone which is being 
much touted by the president and CEC representatives. (2)  The European 
Union’s special envoy for Central Asia, Pierre Morel, added his voice to the 
chorus of praise when he lauded the Turkmen government’s endeavors to 
conduct “more open elections” and commended President Berdimuhammedow 
for the “impressive opening up of the country.” (3)  The EU’s ongoing, and thus 
far unsuccessful, efforts to persuade the Turkmen president to funnel some of his 
country’s vast natural gas supplies toward Europe surely played no role in 
Monsieur Morel’s evaluation of the Turkmen government’s progress on such 
issues as political pluralism and human rights.  OSCE officials, however, seem to 
harbor no illusions regarding the elections, stating in a report released in October 
that genuine political competition currently is not possible in Turkmenistan as 
long as only candidates from pro-government organizations and the country’s 
single registered political party are allowed to participate.  (4) 
 
In addition to the Democratic Party of Turkmenistan (DPT), (5) the national trade 
unions, the Women's Association of Turkmenistan, the War Veterans' 
Organization, the Magtymguly Youth Organisation, and a number of other NGOs 
have been permitted to register candidates in the elections. The NGOs chosen to 
field candidates in the December 14 polls all belong to the National Galkynys 
(Revival) Movement, (6) an umbrella organization created by the government 
that seems to work in close tandem with the DPT.  Roughly ten percent of the 
candidates represent state-sanctioned NGOs, the rest represent the DPT and all 
campaign funding is issued by the government; private campaign funding is 
banned.  Interestingly, although the President Berdimuhammedow has 
vociferously welcomed international election monitors, Western journalists, on 
the other hand, will not be allowed to cover the elections process. (7) 
 
Candidates from groups that do not enjoy the regime’s official support have been 
shut out of the elections wholesale.  One potential candidate, Gurbandurdy 
Durdykuliev, was barred from registering for the ballot by local election officials 
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who told him that he had missed the registration deadline by three days, when, in 
fact he turned in his paperwork three days early.  In addition to lacking the 
support of a state-approved NGO or party, Durdykuliev was incarcerated in a 
psychiatric hospital for two years under President Saparmurat Niyazov’s reign, as 
punishment for submitting a written request to Niyazov to hold a peaceful, anti-
government protest. (8)  Another critic of the regime, Sazak Durdymuradov, also 
was denied registration in the elections and reported having received death 
threats targeting both himself and his family. (9)  Durdymuradov worked as a 
journalist for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty until June 20, 2008, when he was 
seized by the state security services, beaten and tortured until he agreed to sign 
a letter stating that he would no longer work for RFE/RL, and then subsequently 
imprisoned in a psychiatric hospital until early July. (10)  Despite his vows to 
institute greater transparency in Turkmenistan’s political process, President 
Berdimuhammedow seems to share his predecessor’s allergy to even mild 
criticism of that process, nor does he seem eager to provide his citizens with the 
information they would require in order to participate in their country’s political 
life.  
 
Turkmen state media did not begin publishing the names of the parliamentary 
candidates until just three weeks prior to the elections and even then, the lists for 
some districts were not complete. (11)  This week, the Altyn Asyr state television 
channel permitted some of the candidates to give four-minute synopses of their 
election platforms, although an unidentified employee at the television station 
reportedly told the opposition website chrono-tm.org that many of the candidates 
were completely unprepared to give even brief presentations and Altyn Asyr staff 
had to write their speeches for them. (12) 
 
This is not the mark of a regime which genuinely desires the participation of its 
citizens in the political process, in fact it seems to constitute quite the opposite.  
President Berdimuhammedow is to be commended for breaking with his 
predecessor by restoring parts of the country’s much needed educational and 
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public health systems, however on the issues of political openness and human 
rights, he is holding steadfast to the path blazed by Turkmenbashy.  The quantity 
of political candidates may have increased, but the quality of the election process 
itself has not – all of the candidates have been pre-approved by a regime that 
does not even see fit to provide voters with information about those for whom 
they will be voting. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Turkmen parliamentary polls to be widely contested – agency,” 4 Dec 08, 
ITAR-TASS; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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government website; BBC Worldwide Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(3) Anton Lomov, “Turkmen vote seeks new openness, West unconvinced,” 11 
Dec 08, Agence France Presse via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(4) “Democracy groups to assist Turkmen elections,” 19 Nov 08, Associated 
Press via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(5) The Democratic Party of Turkmenistan was founded at the 25th Congress of 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Tymoshenko makes her move; Yushchenko flat-footed 
On Tuesday, 9 December, Ukraine’s parliament elected Volodymyr Lytvyn to the 
speaker’s position in a surprise move that seemed to stun a good portion of the 
deputies present.  (1) It is a return engagement for Lytvyn, who previously served 
as speaker from 2002-2004.  
 
Lytvyn said the moment marked the creation of a new parliamentary majority 
coalition that includes his bloc (BL), the bloc of Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko 
(BYuT) and President Viktor Yushchenko’s Our Ukraine-People’s Self Defense 
(OU-PSD).  “A formal coalition agreement will be signed within days,” he 
announced to parliament.  (2) 
 
It seems, however, that someone forgot to tell Yushchenko and his closest allies.   
Just 40 out of 72 members of OU-PSD voted in Lytvyn’s favor.  This gap in votes 
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was filled by the Communist Party, which unanimously backed Lytvyn, but which 
is not a coalition member. (3) 
 
Moreover, following the vote, several influential OU-PSD members claimed 
“falsification” of the signed memorandum declaring the three parties’ intentions to 
form a coalition. (4)  “There is no signature of the faction leader,” OU-PSD’s 
Ksenia Lyapina said.  Her statement was echoed by fellow member Andriy 
Paruby after the vote.  “Lytvyn announced [the formation of the coalition] too 
early,” he told reporters. (5) 
 
These statements do not appear to correspond entirely with events.  On the 
morning of the vote in favor of Lytvyn, a statement from OU-PSD confirmed that 
41 members—a majority—had “signed a statement for a coalition with BYuT and 
the Bloc of Lytvyn.” (6)  According to Ukraine’s constitution and accepted 
parliamentary procedures, only parties or blocs may form coalitions.  If a majority 
of a bloc’s members sign a statement in favor of a coalition, it is considered 
approved. 
 
Moreover, 55 of 72 OU-PSD members voted to open “official talks with BYuT and 
the Bloc of Lytvyn about the creation of a coalition.” (7)  Five hours after this vote, 
the coalition was announced by Lytvyn. 
 
Given past actions, it is likely that OU-PSD members who oppose a coalition with 
Tymoshenko and Lytvyn had hoped to drag out coalition talks, while undermining 
support for such an idea.  During 2006 and 2007, OU-PSD insisted on lengthy 
negotiations with Tymoshenko as parliament attempted to form majority 
coalitions.  Each time, Tymoshenko charged that these negotiations seemed 
specifically designed to delay an agreement – or perhaps avoid one, altogether.  
It is no secret, after all, that Tymoshenko and Yushchenko do not get along.  
They are expected to be intense rivals in the December 2009 presidential 
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election – although her support far outstrips his (she occupies first place 
according to most polls at approximately 20% compared to his 5%).     
 
The current political crisis was created when Yushchenko’s bloc summarily 
withdrew from the coalition created in 2007, following BYuT’s support for 
legislation that limited presidential power. 
 
The President has been unable to forge a replacement coalition since his bloc 
withdrew.  Most recently, he has suggested that the parliament continue without 
a formal coalition.  Tymoshenko has charged that this would create further 
instability, leaving the government with no clear legislative support.  
 
But, while it was too soon for a minority of members within OU-PSD to declare a 
coalition, the timing was just right for Tymoshenko and her allies.  It is perhaps 
not coincidental that the announcement of the vote for speaker, as well as for the 
coalition, came when neither Yushchenko nor his most powerful allies were in 
Ukraine.  On that day, Yushchenko traveled to Lithuania for an official visit, his 
chief-of-staff began what has been announced as a vacation, and the head of his 
National Security Council traveled to Moscow for the funeral of Patriarch Alexei 
II.   It appears that no announcement was made about the coalition or the vote 
for speaker until all three had left Kyiv.  
 
What a must be cause of concern for the President is the fact that within hours of 
his leaving Kyiv, the majority of his own bloc chose to back a speaker and 
coalition he clearly did not support.  Just over one week earlier, at a meeting 
chaired by the President, OU-PSD had voted to support another candidate—Ivan 
Pluishch—for speaker. (8) 
 
Perhaps seeing the writing on the wall, within hours of their charges of 
falsification, OU-PSD’s dissenters began backtracking.  The three blocs began 
reconfiguring the cabinet to provide several posts for Lytvyn’s Bloc.  As of 
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Thursday, several media sources reported that the transportation minister would 
revert from BYuT’s portfolio to Lytvyn’s, resulting in the dismissal of Yosef 
Vinnsky from the post.  (9) 
 
Ironically, Vinnsky was one of the first politicians to stand up against the 
oppressive methods of former President Leonid Kuchma.  Moreover, he was one 
of the first to demand Kuchma’s resignation after recordings were released in 
2000 that appeared to suggest Kuchma’s compliance in the kidnapping and 
murder of investigative journalist Georgiy Gongadze.  (Kuchma vigorously denies 
this charge.) 
 
Eventually, Vinnsky, Tymoshenko, numerous other opposition politicians and 
Gongadze’s family members also accused Lytvyn of complicity in the murder.  
According to those who have listened to the tapes, what appears to be Lytvyn’s 
voice is heard encouraging Kuchma to “let loose” the Interior Minister “to use 
alternative methods” on Gongadze.  (10) (Lytvyn denies this is his voice and 
strenuously denies any part in the murder.)   Five Interior Ministry officers have 
been found guilty of carrying out the journalist’s murder.   
 
As usual for Ukraine, as circumstances change, so do alliances and so do 
enemies.  Nevertheless, probably it will not be lost on Vinnsky that he will be 
replaced by a member of Lytvyn’s Bloc.  
 
Despite this apparent agreement on staffing issues, a minority of OU-PSD 
members continues to attempt to extend the negotiations or undermine an 
agreement.  Lyapina, for example, first demanded that BYuT give up the Finance 
Ministry.  Since BYuT is by far the largest party in the coalition (156 seats, 
compared to OU-PSD’s 72 and Lytvyn’s 20), that suggestion quickly failed.  
Reportedly Lyapina and her allies also are attempting to include wording that 
would guarantee Ukraine’s continued path toward a NATO MAP and would 
restrict Russian language usage.  Since BYuT receives far more support in the 
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Eastern part of the country than OU-PSD or Lytvyn, it is unlikely the bloc would 
agree to allow these items to be enshrined in the agreement.  The 2007 
agreement does contain a provision favoring NATO entry, but following Ukraine’s 
recent rebuff, the issue has far less urgency. 
 
Missing in all of this discussion is the man who began it all by removing his bloc 
from the previous coalition – President Viktor Yushchenko.   As of Thursday 
evening in Kyiv, Yushchenko had not made any statement about the coalition.  
Indeed, he waited until 10 December before publicly congratulating Lytvyn on his 
election. (11) 
 
It appears that the President has not only lost his ability to influence the formation 
of the coalition, but may lose a number of allies he had appointed to prominent 
positions, thanks to an earlier agreement with Tymoshenko.  The coalition 
announced on Thursday that the head of the State Property Fund—
Yushchenko’s strong ally—would be replaced with a member of BYuT.  BYuT 
also claims to have received consent from OU-PSD to remove Yushchenko’s 
Justice Minister, although this claim is curious since it is a position 
constitutionally guaranteed as a presidential appointment.  Yushchenko’s ally at 
the National Bank also appears to be in trouble.  (12) 
 
In an address to the country on Wednesday, Tymoshenko made clear that she 
had renewed her ties with OU-PSD, but not with Yushchenko.  “You know that 
the situation in Ukraine was recently complicated by a consciously created 
amoral political crisis,” she said.  “I want to thank all political forces, factions, 
people deputies, who by their voting yesterday ended this political disgrace and 
created a coalition. All these positive steps were made not with the aid of the 
President, but in spite of his active opposition to the creation of the coalition.” 
(13) 
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The question now is whether this new coalition, which includes a small but very 
significant group of dissenters, can function in an environment of continuing 
animosity between the prime minister and president.  
 
BYuT is taking no chances and has warned that it will push for simultaneous 
parliamentary and presidential elections if the coalition fails.  
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